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Abstract
These notes consist of two parts. In the first one I present a counter example to
Proposition 3 of Anbarci & Sun (2013). In the second part I propose a correction
based on an axiom similar to one used by Salonen (1988) in the first axiomatization
of the Discrete Raiffa solution.
∗Counterexample and correction for Proposition 3 in N. Anbarci and C.-j. Sun (2013):
Robustness of Intermediate Agreements and Bargaining Solutions
Games and Economic Behavior, 77, 367-376
1 Basic Definitions and Axioms
This section is mainly an extract of relevant parts of the respective section in Anbarci
and Sun (2013) supplemented by some remarks and an axiom from Salonen (1988).
1.1 Basic Definitions
An n-person (bargaining) problem is a pair (S, d), where S ⊂ Rn is the set of utility pos-
sibilities that the players can achieve through cooperation and d ∈ S is the disagreement
point, which is the utility allocation that results if no agreement is reached. For all S, let
IR(S, d) := {x ∈ S|x ≥ d}
be the set of individually rational utility allocations.
Let
∑
be the class of all n-person problems satisfying the following:
(1) The set S is compact, convex and comprehensive.
(2) x > d for some x ∈ S
It will be convenient to consider also
∑˜
, the set of all bargaining problems satisfying
just(1).
Denote the ideal point of (S, d) ∈ ∑˜ as b˜(S, d) = (b˜i(S, d))i=1,...,n where b˜i(S, d) :=
max{xi ∈ R|x ∈ IR(S, d)}; the midpoint of (S, d) ∈
∑˜
is m˜(S, d) :
= 1/n b˜(S, d) + (1 − 1/n)d. Denote by b and m the restrictions of b˜ and m˜ to ∑ ⊂ ∑˜,
respectively.
A solution on
∑˜
is a function f˜ :
∑˜ −→ Rn such that for all (S, d) ∈ ∑˜ we have
f˜(S, d) ∈ S. The restriction of f˜ to ∑ ⊂ ∑˜ is denoted f and is called a solution on ∑.
Consider any bargaining problem (S, d) ∈ ∑˜. The game (HS, d) ∈ ∑˜ defined by HS :
= co {d, b˜1(S, d)e1, ..., b˜n(S, d)en}, with ei, i = 1, ..., n the canonical unit vectors of Rn, is
the “largest hyperplane game contained” in (S, d). The game (HS, m˜(S, d)) is an element
of
∑˜\∑.
Given any bargaining problem (S, d) ∈∑ and a solution f :∑ −→ Rn
D(S, d, f) := {d′ ∈ IR(S, d) | f(S, d′) = f(S, d)}.
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Notice, that this definition employed by Anbarci and Sun (2013) makes use of the assump-
tion that (S, d′) ∈∑. Therefore for the game HS(S, d) ∈∑ the set D(HS, d,m) does not
contain d′ := m(HS, d) = m(S, d) as an element. Therefore, the solution m :
∑ −→ Rn
on
∑
has the property that m(S, d) 6∈ D(S, d,m).
1.2 Axioms
First I introduce the three axioms of Anbarci and Sun (2013) relevant for my analysis.
Then I formulate for the present context and in the present terminology of Anbarci and
Sun an axiom due to Salonen (1988) that is crucial for the announced correction in the
second part of this note. Let f :
∑ −→ Rn be a solution on ∑.
Midpoint Domination (MD)
For any (S, d) ∈∑ : f(S, d) ≥ m(S, d)
Independence of Non-Midpoint-Dominating Alternatives (INMD):
For all (S, d), (T, d) ∈∑ if IR(S,m(S, d)) = IR(T,m(T, d)) then f(S, d) = f(T, d).
As Anbarci and Sun (2013) stress the hypothesis of INMD implies:
b(S, d) = b(T, d) and m(S, d) = m(T, d). Therefore the solution m :
∑ −→ Rn on ∑
satisfies INMD.
Robustness of Intermediate Agreements in the (d, b)-Box (RIA-Box):
For all (S, d), (T, d) ∈∑ such that S ⊂ T and b(S, d) = b(T, d):
(D(S, d, f) ∪ {f(S, d)}) ∩ (D(T, d, f) ∪ {f(T, d)})\{d} 6= ∅.
According to Proposition 3 of Anbarci and Sun (2013) these three axioms (MD, INMD,RIA-
Box) determine uniquely the Discrete Raiffa Solution DR on
∑
, which they define as
follows:
For any (S, d) ∈∑ consider the non-decreasing sequence (mt)t∈N0
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with mt ∈ S for all t ∈ N0 := N ∪ {0},m0 := m(S, d) and mt := m(S,mt−1) for all t ∈ N.
Then DR(S,m) := limt→∞ mt.
Salonen (1988) was the first article to my best knowledge that provided in his Theorem
2 an axiomatization of the Discrete Raiffa solution on the set
∑˜
of bargaining problems.
The three axioms he is using are anonymity, covariance under affine transformations and
an axiom, that he called Second Decomposability axiom.
In the context of
∑
rather than
∑˜
and the terminology of Anbarci and Sun this axiom
can be restated as:
SD : For all (S, d), (T, d) ∈∑ such that S ⊂ T and b(S, d) = b(T, d)
there exists a bargaining problem (A, d) ∈∑ such that:
b(A, d) = b(S, d)(= b(T, d)) and f(A, d) ∈ D(S, d, f) ∩D(T, d, f)
.
In fact, (HS, d) = (HT , d) can serve as such an (A, d) ∈∑.
Based on this insight an axiomatization of the Raiffa solution via repeated application
of the three “standard axioms” Pareto optimality, covariance and symmetry has been
derived in Trockel (2009).
2 A Counterexample to Proposition 3
Let n := 2. The mapping m :
∑ −→ R2 : (S, d) 7→ m(S, d) ∈ S is a solution on ∑. It
provides the counterexample.
I have to verify that m satisfies each of the three axioms of Proposition 3 of Anbarci and
Sun (2013), namely MD, INMD and RIA-Box.
2.1 MD
m satisfies the required weak inequality in MD as equality.
2.2 INMD
It has already been remarked before and in fact, by Anbarci and Sun, that m satisfies
INMD.
4
2.3 RIA - Box
In order to establish RIA-Box for m we need to verify that:
(D(S, d,m) ∪ {m(S, d)} ∩ (D(T, d,m) ∪ {m(T, d)})\{d} 6= ∅
for all (S, d), (T, d) ∈∑ with S ⊂ T and b(S, d) = b(T, d).
First, by b(S, d) = b(T, d) we get m(S, d) = m(T, d) > d.
Therefore we are done, if D(S, d,m) and D(T, d,m) are both well-defined (possibly empty)
sets.
Consider first D(T, d,m) := {d′ ∈ IR(T, d) | m(T, d′) = m(T, d)} IR(T, d) is well
defined as (T, d) ∈ ∑ ⊂ ∑˜ and d ∈ IR(T, d) thus D(T, d,m) 6= ∅. Notice, that
m(T, d) 6∈ D(T, d,m) because by HT ≡ HS ⊆ S ⊂ T we have m(T,m(T, d)) 6= m(T, d).
Next I consider D(S, d,m) = {d′ ∈ IR(S, d) | m(S, d′) = m(S, d)}.
Again IR(S, d) is well defined as (S, d) ∈∑ ⊂ ∑˜ and d ∈ IR(S, d)
thus D(S, d,m) 6= ∅. In the special case that S = HS we have (S,m(S, d)) ∈ ∑˜\∑.
Then m˜(S,m(S, d)) = m(S, d) 6∈ D(S, d,m), as m(S,m(S, d)) is not defined.
Summarizing we get, that D(T, d,m) and D(S, d,m) are non empty sets and that for
m¯ := m(T, d) = m(S, d):
m¯ ∈ (D(T, d,m) ∪ {m¯}) ∩ ((D(S, d,m) ∪ {m¯})\{d}.
This proves the correctness of the counterexample.
3 Correction
Next I will discuss how the axiom RIA-Box can be modified in order to exclude the
solution m but not DR.
First I reformulate RIA-Box as follows:
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Consider an arbitrary pair (S, d), (T, d) ∈∑ such that
S ⊂ T, b(S, d) = b(T, d).
A := (D(S, d, f) ∩ (D(T, d, f))\{d}
B := (D(S, d, f) ∩ {f(T, d})\{d}
C := ({f(S, d)} ∩D(T, d, f))\{d}
D := ({f(S, d)} ∩ {f(T, d})\{d}
Clearly, A, B, C, D may vary with the considered solution f !
RIA-Box is equivalent to: A ∪B ∪C ∪D 6= ∅.
Next I want to see, first for m, then for DR which of the sets A,B,C,D is always, never
or sometimes (depending on the choice of (S, d), (T, d)) non-empty.
3.1 f := m
A: It suffices for me to verify that A may be empty.
Take T := [0, 1]2, S := HT , d := (0, 0). It is easy to see that D(S, d,m) =
co {d,m(S, d)}\{m(S, d)} while D(T, d,m) ={d}. Therefore A = ∅.
B: m(T, d) = m(S, d) 6∈ D(S, d,m) has been established already in the previous section.
So B is always empty.
C: Suppose C 6= ∅. Then m(S, d) ∈ {d′ ∈ IR(T, d) | m(T, d′) = m(T, d)}. This is
equivalent to m(T,m(S, d)) = m(T, d). As S ⊂ T we have in fact m(T,m(S, d)) >
m(T, d) > d. Therefore C = ∅.
D: D is always non-empty as m(T, d) = m(S, d) > d
The solution m :
∑ −→ R2 satisfies RIA-Box if and only if A ∪ B ∪ C ∪ D is always
non-empty. As B∪C is always empty for m RIA-Box holds for m if and only if A∪D is
always non-empty. But this is the case as D is always non-empty for m. It may happen
that A ∪B ∪C = ∅ for m. Therefore requiring A ∪B ∪C = ∅ for all (S, d), (T, d) with
S ⊂ T, b(S, d) = b(T, d) would eliminate m as a solution. Clearly, then already A∪C 6= ∅
would do so.
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3.2 f = DR
A,C,D may be empty or non-empty for suitable choices of (S, d), (T, d) ∈∑, S ⊂ T , with
b(S, d) = b(T, d). Suppose B 6= ∅. This is only possible if f(T, d) = f(S, d) ∈ D(S, d, f).
But f(S, d) ∈ D(S, d, f) requires that f(S, f(S, d)) = f(S, d). However, as (by known
Pareto optimality of DR) (S, f(S, d)) ∈ ∑˜\∑ the term f(S, f(S, d)) is not defined for
f := DR :
∑ −→ R2. So we get B is always empty.
So we may replace A∪B∪C∪D 6= ∅ which is equivalent to RIA-Box, without any effect
on DR by A ∪C ∪D 6= ∅.
I have to make sure now that skipping the D in this assumption, which makes the as-
sumption formally stronger, does not exclude DR. Consider f := DR.
If D = ∅ then A ∪C ∪D 6= ∅ is equivalent to A ∪C 6= ∅.
If D 6= ∅ for some (S, d), (T, d) with S ⊂ T, b(S, d) = b(T, d) then f(T, d) = f(S, d) 6= d
and S 6= HS because f(HS, d) = m(HS, d) = m(S, d) is not Pareto optimal in T , while
f(T, d) = f(S, d) is. But by the definition of DR the point f(HS, d) = m(HS, d) is
the first term m0 in the sequence of points mt ∈ D(S, d, f) converging to f(S, d) and
the first term in the sequence of points m′t ∈ D(T, d, f) converging to f(T, d). Hence,
m0 = m(S, d) ∈ A. So D 6= ∅ implies A 6= ∅. Hence it can never happen that A∪C∪D 6= ∅
for some(S, d), (T, d) while A ∪C = ∅ for f = DR.
So DR satisfies:“A ∪C ∪D always non empty” if and only if it satisfies:
“A ∪C always non empty”.
So the strengthening of RIA-Box has no impact on DR and clearly it does not allow
other solutions to enter that are already excluded by RIA-Box.
So let me rewrite the sloppy assumption: “A ∪ C always non empty” in a formal way
more similar to RIA-Box.
“A ∪C always non empty” means:
RIA∗-Box:
For all (S, d), (T, d) ∈∑ with S ⊂ T and b(S, d) = b(T, d):
(D(S, d, f) ∪ {f(S, d)}) ∩D(T, d, f)\{d} 6= ∅
So this axiom requires that there is an intermediate agreement point p for the larger
bargaining problem (T, d) that is either the solution of the smaller problem (S, d) or also
an intermediate agreement point for (S, d).
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This axiom is somewhat weaker than Salonen’s axiom SD that requires in addition that
p = f(A, d) for some bargaining problem (A, d) ∈∑ with b(A, d) = b(T, d) = b(S, d) and
A ⊆ S.
Going through the analysis we have proved (for n = 2):
Proposition:
DR is the unique solution on
∑
that satisfies MD, INMD and RIA∗-Box.
Remark:
We may replace in this proposition RIA∗-Box by Salonen’s axiom SD, which therefore
turns out not only in combination with anonymity and covariance, but also in combination
with MD and INMD to axiomatize the Discrete Raiffa solution.
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